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social movement and mediation theory. First, the nature of the ties between a 
variety of relevant actors are assessed. Second, the networked opportunities 
and constraints at a discursive and material level of analysis are highlighted 
and finally the resistance strategies they employ towards mainstream culture 
are addressed. It is concluded that at the heart of information and 
communication resistance a dynamic dialectic can be observed between 
mediated opportunities for disruptions and attempts of the powers that be to 
close down these opportunities. Furthermore, it has to be acknowledged that 
reliance on mainstream actors and structures for exposure, funding or hosting 
contentious content comes with risks for radical activists. 
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 2. 
Networked Resistance: 
The Case of WikiLeaks 
 
 
 ‘it takes networks to fight networks’  
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 15) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In about five years time Wikileaks evolved from a faceless intermediary 
enabling whistleblowers to publish documents while remaining anonymous to 
being an active actor, selecting/redacting material and reaching out to 
mainstream media to increase exposure. In November 2007, WikiLeaks had 
its first big scoop when they published the Guantánamo Bay military manual 
entitled Camp Delta Standard Operating Procedures which outlined day-to-
day operations and detailed procedures at the US controlled detention center 
on the Cuban Island. By 2008 WikiLeaks had gained worldwide notoriety and 
respectability within the hacking community, which resulted in more 
whistleblowers using the site to reveal sensitive documents such as those 
incriminating the Swiss bank Julius Bär with regards to tax evasion and 
money laundering, the ‘secret’ Scientology handbooks, private e-mails from 
Sarah Palin or the membership list of the fascist British National Party (BNP).  
 
In doing so, WikiLeaks ‘established a powerful brand identity as a 
technologically sophisticated service capable of distributing purloined data 
anonymously and publicizing its release’ (Fenster, 2011: 7). In subsequent 
years the amount of information revealed and released by WikiLeaks 
increased exponentially. Absolute highlights were the publication in 2010 of 
subsequently (1) the ‘Collateral Murder’ video showing an attack of a U.S. 
Army Apache helicopter on a group of unarmed men in Baghdad, among 
which two Reuters journalists; (2) the Afghan War Diaries, (3) the Iraq War 
Logs and (4) the US diplomatic cables, all emanating from the same source1.  
 
WikiLeaks, Ludlow (2010) argues, is ‘the product of decades of collaborative 
work by people engaged in applying computer hacking to political causes, in 
particular, to the principle that information-hoarding is evil’ (p. 25). From this 
perspective, the case of WikiLeaks should be positioned within a broader 
legacy of information and communication activism and more specifically 
related to newly emerging repertoires of networked contentious action also at 
times denoted as hacktivism. Hacktivism compounds hacking and activism 
and as such it represents the extension of socio-technological struggles into 
the realm of politics beyond the technological and the networked computer 
infrastructures (Jordan, 2008, p. 71). At a tactical level hacktivism is clearly 
differentiated from cyber-terrorism and more aligned with tactics of civic 
disobedience – i.e. hacktivism refers more to disruption than destruction 
(Conway, 2007, p. 88). 
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The two main conceptual lenses through which WikiLeaks will be analyzed 
here are opportunity structures and mediation. The mediation opportunity 
structure is proposed as an over-arching concept to make sense of the 
WikiLeaks case as both information and communication activism – mediation 
processes capture the discursive and symbolic struggles as well as attempts to 
increase mainstream media resonance and the newly emerging networked 
repertoire of contentious action on which organisations such as WikiLeaks 
rely.  
 
The mediation opportunity structure for activists should be seen as partially 
overlapping with the political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1994: 85), but at 
the same time also semi-independent in that it holds its own peculiar 
opportunities and constraints. For activists today the mediation opportunities 
as well as the structural constraints on mediation situate themselves at three 
interwoven levels of analysis: the discursive, mainstream media resonance 
and networks. In terms of networks we can refer here not only to the material 
network infrastructure, but as much to the connections and ties between 
various actors which the network makes possible, but also extending into the 
offline realm. The case of WikiLeaks is situated within this broader framework 
of the meditation opportunity structure by addressing 1) the network of actors 
with a variety of latent, weak and strong ties; 2) the interplay between 
opportunities and constraints at the symbolic/discursive and the material 
level; and 3) the communicative strategies of contention enacted by WikiLeaks 
and its sympathizers.  
 
Networks are often understood as direct and indirect connections between 
individuals and/or organisations in collaborative endeavours. In this regard, 
while network theorists identifies the strength of weak and latent ties 
(Haythornthwaite, 2005), the remaining importance of strong (offline) ties for 
social and political action is stressed by others (della Porta & Diani, 2006). In 
light of the WikiLeaks case the importance of and interaction between these 
various ties is being highlighted. 
 
Furthermore, by drawing on theories from political science and media and 
communication studies, the mediation opportunity structure can be seen as 
operating both at a symbolic/discursive level and a material one, with the 
latter relating to a social constructivist approach to the social shaping of 
technology (Livingstone, 2007). Mediation processes are prime examples of 
the intricate inter-play between agency and structure. Those that strive for 
change are locked in a permanent war of position with those aiming to 
preserve and protect the status quo. At a material level of analysis, the 
network opens up opportunities to resist, but such opportunities for 
networked resistance tend to be closed down very quickly, after which new 
opportunities emerge and so on. This results in a kind of cat-and-mouse 
dynamic between corporate and state actors on the one hand and hacktivists 
on the other (Collins & Mansell, 2005). The case of WikiLeaks is illustrative 
for how mediation through networks enables agency and resistance, but also 
shows how structure can strike back and reassert itself. 
 
Finally, the combining of symbolic and discursive struggles with mediated 
communicative practices of resistance enabled by the network as an 
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infrastructure exposes the use and appropriation of the mediation opportunity 
structure as catering to a variety of strategies of contention in dealing with the 
mainstream political culture they contest. Independent self-mediation 
practices, partial adaptation to the mainstream media logic, attacking 
mainstream actors and abstention from the mainstream public space, all 
distinct media strategies of activists, are often combined to achieve movement 
aims (Rucht, 2004). This is certainly observable in the case of WikiLeaks, 
where the activists involved use self-mediation practices in addition to 
strategies of adaptation, critique and abstention.  
 
Network of Actors: strong, weak and latent ties 
 
While weak ties are often seen to be primarily instrumental, strong ties are 
more emotional and entail more frequent exchanges and interactions. The 
strength of weak ties lies in the ability of individuals and organisations to 
draw support from their weak ties network in terms of experiences, 
information and resources. The strength of strong ties lies in more determined 
motivations and higher degrees of loyalty. Besides weak and strong ties, 
Haythornthwaite (2005) identifies a third type. Networked technologies, she 
argues, ‘support latent social network ties, used here to indicate ties that are 
technically possible but not yet activated socially’ (p. 137).  
 
From a social movement perspective the inter-connections between various 
actors and the networks they form are a crucial aspect of social movements 
and of activism. Networks are increasingly seen to be central to understanding 
present-day social movements, influencing their impact, their ability to 
sustain and coordinate social action (della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 117). In the 
social movement literature the importance of strong offline ties is 
foregrounded, such as family, local networks, membership of associations, etc. 
Recent examples of fluid and less formally organized resistance and debates 
regarding the exact role of information and communication technologies have 
challenged these more traditional conceptions, but at the same time there is 
still evidence that close connections and offline ties to build trust and 
solidarity remain of importance, certainly when it comes to sustaining an 
organisation or struggle. 
 
When approached from the level of actors, the case of WikiLeaks exposes a 
variety of strong and weak, but also of latent ties. WikiLeaks as an 
organisations combines the development of very strong ties amongst core-
members and journalists with the strength of weak and latent ties when it 
comes to volunteers and those that leak information or the loose and latent 
inter-connections with the hacktivist collective Anonymous.  
 
Strong Ties 
 
The book ‘Inside WikiLeaks’ by former number two of the organisation Daniel 
Domscheit-Berg (2011) reveals how the organisation was structured and run. 
In the book Domscheit-Berg outlines the closed and tight-knit nature of the 
organisation with a small core of highly dedicated activists, a clear-cut 
division of labour and quite hierarchical. However, beyond such eye-witness 
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accounts from former insiders, it is very difficult to get a sense of who the 
actors inside WikiLeaks are and how it is structured today.  
 
One of the contradiction at the center of WikiLeaks is that striving for 
transparency of governance and freedom of information requires a degree of 
internal secrecy and above all concealment of the identity of those that take 
the risk of relegating government or corporate ‘secrets’ to the public domain. 
Assange (2011) justifies this strategic opacity as follows: 
 
one of our core principles is to protect the identities of whistleblowers. So 
sometimes one needs to be opaque to protect people. We are an organisation 
facing extraordinary threats from a superpower (np).  
 
While the at some point WikiLeaks claimed to have 800 volunteers and some 
40 core-members working for them (Burns & Somaiya, 2011, p. 36), the 
organisation also gradually became identified with the personality and 
charismatic figure of its founder Assange. In his book, Domscheit-Berg (2011) 
accuses Assange of turning WikiLeaks into a one-man show and loosing sight 
of the values it preached. Assange became the sole personification of 
WikiLeaks and to strengthen this perception he created an ‘informational 
vacuum at the heart of a secretive organization whose motto is transparency’ 
(p. 1). 
 
In the introduction to the book WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on 
Secrecy by journalists Leigh and Harding (2011), Guardian editor-in-chief 
Alan Rusbridger attests to how Assange strategically started to reach out to 
journalists very early on. In August 2007, the Guardian published a story 
based on documents leaked to WikiLeaks relating to corruption by the regime 
of Arap Moi in Kenya (Rice, 2007). In subsequent years the connections with 
journalists were intensified and expanded, certainly after Nick Davies, another 
Guardian journalist, convinced Assange that the explosive US military and 
diplomatic information WikiLeaks had received ‘would have more impact and 
meaning if he was willing to ally with one or two newspapers – however 
traditional and cowardly or compromised we might be in the eyes of some 
hackers’ (Rusbridger, in Leigh & Harding, 2011, p. 17). 
 
One of the characteristics of strong ties is that they are emotional and that also 
has a downside. As is apparent from the critical tone in Domscheit’s book, the 
very close connections of the core-members within WikiLeaks became 
destructive at some point. After repeated clashes and conflicts with Assange, 
Domscheit-Berg was first suspended and subsequently quit the organisation 
in September 2010. Besides this, the man responsible for the technical side of 
things called ‘The Architect’ left too, taking with him all the code he wrote and 
the intricate and secure technical structure he had built. At the time of writing 
– early 2012 – WikiLeaks is still not accepting new leaks: 
 
At the moment WikiLeaks is not accepting new submissions due to re-
engineering improvements the site to make it both more secure and more 
user-friendly. […] We anticipate reopening the electronic drop box and live 
chat support in the near future. (http://wikileaks.ch/Submissions.html - 
retrieved on 01/02/2012) 
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Also the relationship between Assange and the journalists, with whom he had 
built strong links, would turn sour. Assange increasingly felt betrayed by them 
because of the way in which they reported, unfavourably according to him, on 
the allegations of sexual misconduct filed against him in Sweden (see Leigh & 
Harding, 2011; Keller, 2011).  
 
Weak Ties 
 
Anonymity is crucial for whistleblowers who often put their careers and 
sometimes even their physical integrity and/or freedom at risk by leaking 
sensitive hidden information. As Domscheit-Berg (2011: 37) points out, great 
efforts were made to make sure that even WikiLeaks itself did not know the 
identity of the whistleblower as leaked information was sent ‘through so many 
detours, encryptions, and anonymizing procedures […] that no one could trace 
where they came from’. For example, WikiLeaks did not know the identity of 
the person who leaked the Afghanistan and Iraq diaries as well as the 
diplomatic cable until U.S. private Bradley Manning was arrested on 26 May 
2010 after bragging about his exploits in a chat room.  
 
Given the secretive nature of the organisation and the tight control of 
information by Assange, the object of critique by Domscheit-Berg, it could be 
argued that the volunteers WikiLeaks relied upon for very particular and 
specific tasks have weak links with the organisation. They are mostly used in 
an instrumental way and unable to have any impact on the organisation 
beyond the specific task they have been given by Assange or others at the core 
of the organisation. If Domscheit-Berg is accurate even core-members were 
often left in the dark by Assange regarding certain actions or strategies 
pursued. 
 
WikiLeaks also relied heavily on weak links in the wake of the publication of 
the Afghan and Iraq War diaries and the diplomatic cables and as the 
organisation increasingly came under attack by corporate and government 
actors. Through these weak links, WikiLeaks and Assange received a huge 
amount of publicity and garnered considerable public support. On 8 
December 2011, the Australian Internet organization GetUp! posted a letter of 
support for Julian that attracted 45,000 signatures within 48 hours. Public 
figures such as the Pentagon papers leakers Daniel Elsberg, filmmaker 
Michael Moore, and author Naomi Wolf also spoke out in support of Assange 
and of WikiLeaks.  
  
Latent Ties 
 
The links between WikiLeaks and other information and communication 
activists, such as the Hacktivist collective Anonymous could be described as 
latent, in the sense that there are no apparent direct connections between 
both, but at strategic moments Anonymous aligned its struggle with 
WikiLeak’s plight. The links between WikiLeaks and the decentralised hacker 
collective Anonymous date back from 2007 when WikiLeaks received 
unexpected help from Anonymous to publish and structure all the Church of 
Scientology material they had received. This US-based sect was the first target 
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of Anonymous and the hackers collective was all too happy to voluntarily 
prepare ‘the site so that readers could find their way more easily through the 
deluge of documents’ (Domscheit-Berg, 2011, p. 38). 
 
After this episode the ties turned latent again, only to be reactivated when 
WikiLeaks was severely crippled through corporate repression after they 
leaked the US diplomatic cables. Anonymous subsequently revamped its 
‘Operation Payback’ – initially targeted at the music industry, into ‘Operation 
Avenge Assange’ – a campaign of retaliation in defense of WikiLeaks and 
Assange. Coldblood, a self-proclaimed spokesperson of Anonymous issued the 
following statement attesting to this: 
 
Anonymous is supporting WikiLeaks not because we agree or disagree with 
the data that is being sent out, but we disagree with any from of censorship on 
the internet. If we let WikiLeaks fall without a fight then governments will 
think they can just take down any sites they wish or disagree with. (Coldblood, 
quoted in Halliday & Arthur, 2010) 
 
While there never was a direct connection between Anonymous and 
WikiLeaks there were mutual sympathies and latent ties, which were activated 
at crucial points when their respective struggles aligned themselves. 
 
Mediated Opportunities and Structural Constraints 
 
As a theoretical construct, mediation is often critiqued for being conceptually 
fuzzy, too general, not analytical enough and furthermore overly media-
centric (Lundby, 2009, p. 3). One of the main reasons for this is that 
mediation attempts to be all encompassing. It aims to conceptually grasp as 
well as complicate the interactions between various analytical dichotomies 
such as public versus private, producer of content versus the receiver, the 
symbolic versus the material and crucially structure versus agency. This 
indeed makes it fuzzy, but also apt at making sense of the increased 
pervasiveness and ubiquity of media and communication in our everyday life 
and in politics. 
 
In social movement theory, the concept of opportunity structure is also 
contested as neglecting the symbolic, overemphasizing process over culture 
and structure over agency. Combining the inherently dialectic nature of 
mediation with the concept of opportunity structure might offer a potential 
way out of this paradigmatic conundrum, overcoming the stark contradiction 
between structure and agency and between process and culture. As Koopmans 
(1999) rightly argues, accounting for structures does not deny the potential for 
agency or even sudden change, it just makes the obvious point that ‘not all of 
opportunity is agency, but that some of it is structured’ (p. 102). Approaching 
the opportunity structure in such a more dialectical way enables us to account 
for both structural impediments to and opportunities for change.  
 
The WikiLeaks case is analyzed in view of the discursive and networked 
opportunities it exploits, but also the particular structural constraints it has to 
contend with both at the symbolic level and the material. 
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Discursive Opportunities and Constraints 
 
The discursive opportunity structure foremost relates to the frames that are 
being used and disseminated to justify a particular struggle, to propagate an 
alternative vision and to mobilize for direct action (Ferree, et al. 2002). As 
such, in the social movement literature the use of diagnostic (what is the 
problem), prognostic (what is to be done) and motivational (what can we do) 
frames are distinguished (Snow & Benford, 1988).  
 
At the diagnostic level WikiLeaks inscribes itself in a broader movement of 
freedom of information activism, concerned with free access to information, 
as well as transparency and accountability within a democracy, to expose what 
those that represent us and govern in our name attempt to keep hidden. These 
frames are directed against well-known strategies of concealment and secrecy 
of corporations to protect their business interests and of governments to 
protect the ‘national interest’ (Florini, 2004), but they equally apply to the 
whole debate converning copyright (Cammaerts, 2011). 
 
At a prognostic level, the advent of the information society in the 1990s and 
the digitalization of information have played a pivotal role in providing 
tactical opportunities for those advocating for a more open and transparent 
government. However, at the tactical level divisions within the freedom of 
information movement can be observed. While conventional transparency 
advocates operate within the confinements and rules of engagement of liberal 
democracy, radical freedom of information activists or ‘the guerrilla front of 
the transparency movement’ (Brooke, 2011, p. 17), argues that legal activism is 
not enough and adopts more radical tactics such as anonymous 
whistleblowing. 
 
At the motivational level, discourse serves to ‘suggest not merely that 
something can be done but that “we” can do something’ (Gamson, 1992, p. 7). 
In this regard, WikiLeaks clearly demonstrated through their online platform 
that something could be done, establishing a safe haven for potential 
whistleblowers to securely post the information they wish to leak. In addition 
to this, WikiLeaks also did their utmost to make sure that the leaks they 
published received ample media resonance and thus reached beyond netizens. 
 
Changing attitudes and discourse towards government transparency 
 
Arguments of national security are often invoked to legitimate the need for 
secrecy and concealment in a democracy and this is especially the case in 
times of war – ‘In war, truth is the first casualty’, the Greek dramatist 
Aeschylus proclaimed. Margaret Thatcher’s defense of limiting civic liberties 
at the height of the IRA-crisis can be seen in a similar light: 
 
We do sometimes have to sacrifice a little of the freedom we cherish in order 
to defend ourselves from those whose aim is to destroy the freedom altogether 
– and that is a decision we should not be afraid to take. […] The only victory 
will be our victory: the victory of democracy and a free society. (Speech at the 
Lord Mayor’s annual Banquet, 14/11/1988) 
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As this quote above exposes, the relationship between democracy as a model 
of governance and secrecy remains conceptually fraught and inherently 
contradictory. Hence, while the current policy discourse is often one of 
transparency and open government, the different classifications to denote the 
degree and nature of secrecy of documents and information – from 
‘confidential’ via ‘secret’ to ‘top secret’ – remain firmly in place.  
 
At the other end of the continuum we find those advocating for the 
transparency of government and corporate information. Transparency 
advocates base themselves on a Kantian imperative that considers lying to be 
morally wrong in all circumstances (Korsgaard, 1989) and on a strong belief 
that those in representative positions of power need to be fully accountable to 
those from whom they derive their power, to argue that secrecy is antithetical 
to democracy and a democratic society. It is the expression of mistrust of 
decision makers towards those that they rule (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 2). 
 
In an attempt to address these concerns and critiques many States introduced 
Freedom of Information (FoI) laws providing legal guarantees for citizens to 
access government information. At least at a symbolic level, the introduction 
of FoI legislations represented a change in the way the provision of 
government information was organised. While before, information was 
provided to citizens on a ‘need to know’ basis, FoI laws turned this into a ‘right 
to know’ (Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006, p. 93). To date almost 90 
countries have enacted specific FoI legislations. However, despite the 
adoption of far-reaching FoI-laws in many countries, the degree of exceptions 
States can invoke to deny citizens their right to know and the number of 
loopholes is still considerable. This leads Kierkegaard (2009) to conclude that 
the abundance of opt-outs re-asserting the principle of secrecy leads to FoI 
laws being almost pointless. 
 
Besides enabling legal requests from citizens for government information the 
principles of FoI also include adequate protections for so-called 
whistleblowers. Whistleblowing is a practice involving ‘speaking out from 
within an organization to expose a social problem or, more generally, to 
dissent from dominant views or practices.’ (Martin, 1999, p. 16). It is generally 
accepted, however, that the legal protections for whistleblowing are often 
inadequate and that those engaging in such practices take considerable risks.  
 
The shoot-the-messenger syndrome is rife – ‘[i]nstead of their message being 
evaluated, the full power of the organization is turned against the 
whistleblower’ (ibid: p. 19). Common counter-tactics of organizations include 
harassment, ostracism, bullying, reprimands, demotion and dismissal. This 
explains why many whistleblowers prefer to remain anonymous rather than 
seeking full publicity and why the more radical forms of information and 
transparency activism – such as WikiLeaks – have been gaining strength in 
recent years.  
 
The Discursive War of Position 
 
As it became apparent to Assange that 'the more important and the bigger the 
leak is, the less chance it has of being reported if it is being distributed to 
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everyone at once'2, he started developing even stronger ties with a limited 
number of journalists in order to increase media resonance and exposure of 
the content WikiLeaks publishes. As a result, initially journalists of the New 
York Times, The Guardian and Der Spiegel were given exclusive access to the 
material relating to Afghanistan. This was subsequently expanded to Al 
Jazeera and Channel4 for the Iraq War Diaries and to El País and Le Monde 
for the US diplomatic cables. In an op-ed in an Australian newspaper, Assange 
(2010) called this tactic ‘scientific journalism’: 
 
We work with other media outlets to bring people the news, but also to prove 
it is true. Scientific journalism allows you to read a news story, then to click 
online to see the original document it is based on. That way you can judge for 
yourself: Is the story true? Did the journalist report it accurately? 
 
As mentioned earlier, Assange reached out to the media very early on when he 
started WikiLeaks, acknowledging that in order to have a serious impact at a 
discursive level, information activism must resonate in the mainstream media. 
His solution was taking transparency warfare to the masses, quite literally as 
was shown with the release of the Collateral Murder-video3 (April 2010), 
which was widely reported and showed images from an Apache helicopter 
shooting at journalists and unarmed Iraqi civilians. After that, the 
Afghanistan and Iraq war logs (July and October 2010) and the U.S. 
diplomatic cables (November 2010) caused even more international havoc, 
exposing the brutality of war and the cynicism of real-politik.  
 
Such discursive attacks never go unchallenged by the forces that are the object 
of attack. The more popular WikiLeaks became, the more sensitive 
information was leaked through its secure platform, the more the organisation 
and its founder became the focus of security services and the target of legal 
challenges. Besides a scuppered attempt in 2008 by the Swiss bank Julius Bär 
to block WikiLeaks’ domain name, the efforts to counter-attack and discredit 
WikiLeaks were stepped-up considerably after the leaking of the US 
diplomatic cables.  
 
The U.S. Justice Department started investigating whether Assange could be 
personally indicted with violating the 1917 Espionage Act. U.S. Senator and 
chair of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Joe 
Lieberman called upon Amazon to stop hosting WikiLeaks and Amazon duly 
complied. Some commentators started labeling Assange as an ‘information 
anarchist’ (see Crovitz, 2010) and Sarah Palin called for Assange ‘to be hunted 
down like Osama Bin Laden’ thereby positioning WikiLeaks within the 
terrorism frame. Larry Sanger, co-founder of Wikipedia, tweeted: ‘I consider 
[WikiLeaks] enemies of the U.S.—not just the government, but the people’4.  
 
Matters were, however, to become much worse and much more divisive when 
Assange had to address accusations of sexual misconduct in Sweden and an 
international arrest warrant was issued (Leigh, et al., 2010). As mentioned 
earlier, the immense pressure on Assange and on WikiLeaks as an 
organisation ultimately led to a split at the core of the organisation as distrust 
amongst the core members grew and long-term internal conflicts boiled over. 
At a discursive level all this led that the emphasis of the debate rapidly shifted 
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from the actual content of the leaks to the personality of Assange, but also to 
the collateral damage and harm caused by the release of the classified 
material. 
 
Material Opportunities and Constraints 
 
One of the most pervasive slogans of the early hacker movement was 
‘Information wants to be free’, pointing to its ethics of open access to 
information and (technical) knowledge. Computing power in combination 
with telecommunication networks have for many years been the tools par 
excellence for hackers. However, as Chadwick (2006) quite rightly reminds us 
‘the very idea of a single community of hackers that share a common culture 
has been difficult to sustain’ (p. 130). That is why in this article the focus is 
more specifically on Hacktivism rather than hackers and hacking in general.  
 
Hacktivism was first coined in 1998 by Omega, a hacker of the US hackers 
collective The Cult of the Dead Cow5, also known as cDc, to indicate the use of 
hacking for political change rather than personal gain (Delio, 2004). While 
hacktivism first related foremost to the use and development of software to 
protect human rights and privacy on the internet, its meaning soon broadened 
to technology enabled political activism beyond the internet.  
 
As the use of the nickname Omega shows, communication resistance enacted 
by activists requires anonymity and the use of pseudonyms, which is 
technologically facilitated. Despite this, just as other forms of radical 
resistance, information and communication resistance invites state 
repression, corporate pressure and legal responses. However, the network 
does provide opportunities for hactivists to retaliate and fight back. First, the 
opportunities created by the changes from a paper-based government to an e-
government will be highlighted. 
 
The shift from a paper culture to a digital culture 
 
The relatively swift introduction of ICTs in public administrations and in the 
‘business’ of government during the 1990s and 2000s was mainly the result of 
a techno-optimist and celebratory institutional discourse surrounding the 
presumed benefits of the information society and the quest of governments to 
reduce the costs of running public administrations and services (Garnham, 
2005). Besides this, the introduction of ICTs in public administrations was 
also part of a broader shift from a bureaucratic ‘self-preservation’ paradigm to 
a more consumer and service-oriented paradigm advocating an open 
transparent government and public administration (Mayer-Schönberger & 
Lazer, 2007).  
 
Of particular concern here are the efforts of governments and public 
administrations to increase internal efficiency through the digitalization of 
internal communication flows and archives, the development of secure cross-
departmental intranets, and the linking-up of disparate databases with the 
aim to reduce overall costs and making so-called Government-to-Government 
(G2G) communication more efficient (Chadwick, 2006). Besides this, as 
outlined above the practical implications of Freedom of Information laws 
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required governments to become more transparent externally and provide 
performant and user-friendly informational services to citizen (C) and 
businesses (B), so-called G2C and G2B services.  
 
At the same time, this e-government digitalization process has made States 
much more vulnerable when it comes to keeping their secrets under wraps, 
certainly as diplomacy has also digitalized (Rana & Kurbalija, 2007). 
Information hactivists are acutely aware of the growing use of the internet and 
digital technologies by governments, which has created unprecedented 
opportunities to expose information ‘that was not intended for distribution 
outside certain vetted channels’ (Sterner, 2011, p. 5). 
 
So while the leaking of sensitive and classified information is by no means a 
new phenomenon, the digitalization of records, memo’s, minutes, reports and 
mail has certainly made it easier and has made classified information more 
vulnerable to leaking beyond the eyes of those for whom it was meant.  
 
Technology-Enabled Anonymity  
 
Since 1999, a group called Hactivismo – a special project under the umbrella 
of cDc – dedicates all its efforts to the development of anti-censorship 
software specifically geared towards protecting human rights, fostering 
activism, enabling dissent and preventing detection of communication by 
security forces. This exposes the instrumental side of communication 
resistance, assisting those that resist in the offline world. Hacktivismo 
describes its mission as such: 
 
To conduct and publish scientific research in the areas of information 
technology, communications and electronic media; and, to assist (where 
possible) non-governmental organizations, social justice groups and human 
rights entities in the use of advanced information technologies for the 
furtherance of their works. We also intend to have fun doing this. Turn it up. 
Way up6.  
 
While the cDc has always been political – it even fielded a US presidential 
candidate every election since 1992 – Hacktivismo signaled a new phase in 
hacktivist practices, positioning themselves ‘at the forefront of the ongoing 
struggle for human rights in and out of cyberspace’ 7 . Over the years 
Hactivismo has developed many applications that enable internet users to 
anonymize themselves when they are online. Three of these are of particular 
interest here: Torpark (web-browser), Torbird (email client) and Scatterchat 
(IM client). While Torpark will be addressed more in detail here, the other two 
software applications work along the same principle and use the same 
network and technique to conceal the identity of those communicating.  
 
Torpark refers to ‘Deer Park’, the codename for Mozilla's open source browser 
Firefox 1.5 on which Torpark is based. It uses a global network of encrypted 
proxy-servers called Tor 8  and a technique called onion-routing which 
repeatedly encrypts data and then sends it through several intermediate 
routers masking the origin and the destination of the data. The US Navy 
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patented onion routing in 1998 and was initially set-up to secure government 
communication9.  
 
By using the onion routing technique, Torpark and other Tor-related 
applications enable individuals to use the same network to disguise their 
location and identity from law enforcers, but also from websites targeting 
advertising or companies monitoring your online search patterns. The main 
disadvantages of the Tor-network are that it slows down your connection 
considerably and especially that it is an open system that can potentially be 
attacked by third parties. In 2007 a new version of Torpark was released 
called XeroBank Browser, which provided access to the Xerobank anonymous 
network, run by a commercial operator called Xero Networks AG, founded in 
Saint Kitts & Nevis in the Caribbean. Xero Networks offers faster (broadband) 
anonymous connections and a more secure environment by denying third 
parties the right to snoop and monitor. Xero Networks thus offers an extra 
layer of protection so to speak.  
 
The Empire Strikes Back 
 
Besides a discursive backlash, WikiLeaks also had to contend with serious 
challenges at a material level of analysis. The strategy to expel WikiLeaks from 
the network was two-fold; on the one hand attempts were made to block 
access to the WikiLeaks content and on the other hand its ability to generate 
funds through donations was severely disrupted. At the level of content, both 
the physical hosting of the actual content as well as the linkage between IP-
address and the domain names of WikiLeaks were targeted. 
 
On 2 December 2010, four days after publishing the US diplomatic cables, 
Amazon terminated its contract with WikiLeaks. While US senator Joe 
Lieberman had urged US companies, naming Amazon in particular, to sever 
their links with WikiLeaks and Assange (Poulsen, 2010), Amazon denied that 
blocking access to the diplomatic cables was a result of state pressure, instead 
they claimed that WikiLeaks had breached their ‘terms of service’: 
 
It’s clear that WikiLeaks doesn’t own or otherwise control all the rights to this 
classified content. Further, it is not credible that the extraordinary volume of 
250,000 classified documents that WikiLeaks is publishing could have been 
carefully redacted in such a way as to ensure that they weren’t putting 
innocent people in jeopardy. (http://aws.amazon.com/message/65348/ - 
retrieved 01/06/2011) 
 
In addition to this, on the same day, the US-based domain name provider 
EveryDNS Inc. suspended their service to WikiLeaks. They claimed the 
domain names of WikiLeaks were being attacked incessantly by so-called 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks, putting other users of their 
service at risk. As a result of all this, WikiLeaks was forced to move the hosting 
of their content to the French service provider OVH and use a Swiss DNS 
provider. In the section below other resistance strategies to counter this state 
and corporate clampdown will be discussed further. 
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As mentioned above, besides the efforts to close down access to the 
WikiLeaks’ website, its financing was also targeted. After the Cablegate, end of 
November 2010, several banks and companies facilitating online donations 
and payments blocked accounts pertaining to WikiLeaks. In quick succession 
PayPal, Moneybookers, Visa, MasterCard, BankAmerica and the Swiss bank 
PostFinance closed, froze or restricted the accounts of WikiLeaks. Again, the 
justification used by these corporations to do this, was that WIkileaks had 
breached their terms and conditions. PayPal, for example, sent out a press-
release on 3 December 2010, saying that they  
 
permanently restricted the account used by WikiLeaks due to a violation of 
the PayPal Acceptable Use Policy, which states that our payment service 
cannot be used for any activities that encourage, promote, facilitate or instruct 
others to engage in illegal activity.10 
 
All this shows the vulnerability of radical activists when relying too much on 
the corporate structures that rule the internet and facilitate financial 
transactions online. While this is an illustration of the constraints of the 
networked opportunity structure, there are also plenty of opportunities the 
network provides to resist and to retaliate.  
 
Networked Strategies of Contention  
 
Activists typically enact a variety of strategies when dealing with mainstream 
political cultures. Rucht (2004) identified four such strategies when studying 
the history of protest movements, which I present here in a somewhat 
different order for narrative purposes – the development of alternatives to the 
mainstream, adaptation to the mainstream, attack of the mainstream and 
abstention from the mainstream. As will be shown in what follows, WikiLeaks 
and Assange in particular used all four of these strategies interchangeably.  
 
Alternatives 
 
At the outset WikiLeaks operated at the level of complete independence from 
the system, developing alternatives that completely bypass mainstream public 
spaces, positioning themselves as merely making information that was sent to 
them accessible through their website, unaltered and as they had received it. 
Gradually WikiLeaks built-up its name recognition and reputation as a 
maverick organisation releasing ever more explosive content. The long-term 
involvement of both Assange and Domscheit-Berg in the hackers-movement, 
respectively in Australia and Germany, played an important role in terms of 
building their social capital within the freedom of information movement.  
 
However, the increased notoriety of WikiLeaks as an organisation amongst 
the likeminded did not necessarily translate in more attention for the actual 
content of the leaks in the mainstream media as a whole, nor did it wield more 
funding to keep the organisation and their networked infrastructure running. 
In November 2009 someone leaked 500.000 text messages relating to 9/11, 
mostly by US officials. They provided an account of the panic, fear and chaos 
that was prevalent that day. In the course of publishing these messages 
WikiLeaks discovered that that wealth of information did not yield much 
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publicity for the content in the first instance, nor for WikiLeaks as an 
organisation. In fact, they had also run out of money and it was decided to 
shut down WikiLeaks on 23 December 2009 as a kind of signal to the world 
and to garner (financial) support (Domscheit-Berg, 2011, p. 104).  
 
Adaptation 
 
When Wikileaks went back online in January 2010 an important lesson had 
been learned. WikiLeaks decided to change its strategy from relying on 
alternatives to adapt more to the media logic, even if that entailed 
relinquishing some of its principles. The collateral murder video is a good 
example of this. Instead of releasing the raw footage, WikiLeaks decided to 
edit the footage in order to increase its impact, subtitling what was said and 
adding a provocative quote of Orwell on the deceiving nature of political 
language. In doing so, WikiLeaks renaged on its promise to publish material 
as they received it and started assuming an editorial role and stance.  
 
When they received the Afghan, Iraqi and diplomatic data, it became clear 
quite quickly that WikiLeaks would need help and resources in order to make 
sense of the millions of leaked documents and increase their impact in the 
global media. Allies were sought and found in the mainstream media to build 
an extensive database able to make connections and do searches (Leigh & 
Harding, 2011; Keller, 2011). These exclusive deals were designed to ensure 
that global mainstream media outlets would run long series of stories on the 
basis of the leaked documents, which ideally would be reinforced by other 
media across the world.  
 
While this was successful to a large extent, the deluge of Wikileaks stories at 
some point has undoubtedly led to them becoming less newsworthy, leading 
to what was called WikiLeaks fatigue. Even with the active involvement of 
journalists and global media organisations, overload of WikiLeaks related 
reports was considered a problem. One of the main problems, Domscheit-
Berg (2011) acknowledges, ‘was the sheer volume of data. The collection of 
material was too large for people to enter into the debate simply’ (p. 153). 
 
Attack 
 
The network ‘allows clever workarounds and David-against-Goliath battles 
that can sometimes reward technical virtuosity and tactics over the brute force 
of state authority and capitalist logic’ (Fenster, 2011, p. 15). As such, 
WikiLeaks, as well as loosely associated actors, enacted several networked 
resistance strategies to counter the efforts of state and corporate actors to 
close down its operations. Such attack strategies are an illustration of the 
constitutive role that communication resistance can play in becoming direct 
action rather than just facilitating it.  
 
On 30 July 2010, four days after releasing the Afghan War Diaries, WikiLeaks 
distributed a 1.4 Gb encrypted file called ‘insurance.aes256’. It was preemptive 
move against the various legal and extra-legal attacks it was expecting. The file 
was first given to some trusted parties on USB-sticks, but later on it was also 
distributed worldwide through the BitTorrent peer2peer network 11 . It is 
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unknown what the file exactly contains, but the idea would be that if anything 
happened to WikiLeaks/Assange, the password for this file would be made 
publicly available allowing anyone who has downloaded the file on their 
computer to unlock it. 
 
When Amazon ousted WikiLeaks and EveryDNS ceased to link their domain 
name to their IP address, they simply moved their content and DNS service to 
European providers. A tweet from WikiLeaks on 1 December 2010 read: ‘Free 
speech the land of the free – fine our $ are now spent to employ people in 
Europe’12. In the aftermath of this, several mirror sites sprung up all over the 
internet, making sure the content of WikiLeaks remained accessible13.  
 
The repression against WikiLeaks also activated latent ties with the hacktivist 
collective Anonymous, who through coordinated Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks targeted the websites of respectively PostFinance (6/12/2010), 
EveryDNS (7/12/2010), MasterCard (8/12/2010), Visa (8/12/2010), PayPal 
(9/12/2010) and MoneyBookers (10/12/2010). Amazon was also targeted, but 
that particular attack had to be aborted because the ‘hive’ of computers 
engaged in the operation was not ‘big enough to attack Amazon’ (Tweet on 
#AnonOpsNet, 9/12/2010). Besides corporate actors, Anonymous also 
attacked political actors such as Sarah Palin’s PAC (8/12/2010) and two days 
later an affiliate site conservatives4palin.com. Joe Lieberman was also a prime 
target and his Senate website was briefly disrupted14.  
 
More controversial, certainly from within the Hacker movement, were the 
attacks on the Swedish Prosecution Authority on 7 December 2010, followed 
by an attack the next day on the lawyers’ firm Borgstrom and Bodström 
which represents the two women accusing Assange of sexual molestation. The 
attacks on the Swedish prosecutor’s office and the lawyer-firm was, according 
to those within the hacker movement who wanted to separate WikiLeaks as a 
project and an activist organisation from the personality and private issues of 
its eccentric and autocratic founder, highly problematic (Domscheit-Berg, 
2011, p. 207). As explained earlier, the case of WikiLeaks also brings to bare 
the problems of collapsing the political and the personal and the conflicts this 
can potentially produce internally and with latent actors. 
 
Abstention  
 
Given the opacity of WikiLeaks as an organisation, some degree of temporal 
abstention also features prominently in the strategies of WikiLeaks; engaging 
with and adapting to mainstream logics, but at other times disengaging from 
it and abstaining from interaction. As Guardian editor-in-chief Rusbridger 
recalls: ‘Assange was, at the best of times, difficult to contact, switching 
mobile phones, email addresses and encrypted chat rooms as often as he 
changed his location’ (in Leigh & Harding, 2011, p. 17). Also Domscheit-Berg 
(2011) accounts of numerous periods in which Assange was unreachable even 
for core-members of the organisation.  
 
After the clampdown following the release of the diplomatic cables, Assange 
and WikiLeaks increasingly abstained fully from engagement with 
mainstream culture or society at large. As mentioned earlier WikiLeaks 
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disabled their online submission system and Assange himself largely 
disappeared from the mainstream public space, concentrating on the court-
case against him deciding on his extradition to Sweden. 
 
Conclusions 
 
At the level of networks, the WikiLeaks case exemplifies how the development 
of strong offline ties is combined with the strength of weak mediated ties as 
well as with the activation of latent ties at strategic moments. However, the 
complication when analyzing WikiLeaks and its networks consists in the 
difficulty to distinguish WikiLeaks as an organisation from its main 
spokesperson and founder Assange. This led to conflictual tensions with 
detrimental effects on the strong ties with core-members and journalists, as 
well as splitting latent sympathizers. 
 
Despite this, WikiLeaks presents itself as a fascinating case to understand the 
dynamics of mediated resistance and its consequences on power. Benkler 
(2011) concludes that WikiLeaks represents a ‘vivid instance of the ways in 
which the networked society has disrupted traditional pathways for the 
exercise of power and created new dimensions of power and new degrees of 
freedom’ (p. 750). Both at a discursive level of analysis as well as a material 
one, opportunities were seized to further the anti-war and pro-transparency 
discourse, to increase the impact of the leaks, to protect the identity of 
activists and whistleblowers.  
 
However, as pointed out in the analysis the empire always tends to strike back 
and this time with a vengeance. WikiLeaks and Assange were positioned 
within the terrorism frame and serious attempts were made to close down its 
operations, exposing the vulnerability of radical activists when they are 
dependent on market-based platforms for hosting content and for funding 
purposes. Furthermore, the abundance of information and of WikiLeaks 
related reporting at some point revealed to be problematic in its own right, as 
WikiLeaks fatigue set in. It is therefore debatable whether WikiLeaks really 
managed to disrupt the traditional pathways of power in the long run as 
suggested by Benkler. 
 
WikiLeaks as well as other related actors, such as Anonymous, employ a 
variety of strategies in their relations with mainstream political culture. The 
development of an alternative space for the posting of leaked information and 
its growing social capital amongst the hacker communities were instrumental 
to the rise of WikiLeaks and arguably led to more and more documents being 
leaked through its platform. However, WikiLeaks increasingly started 
assuming an editorial role and adapting to the media logic by involving 
mainstream media actors and granting them exclusivity in order to increase 
media resonance. This came at a cost, namely loosing control of the data 
leaked to its site thereby also undermining its credibility and social capital. 
When WikiLeaks was crippled by corporate repression, a strategy of attack 
became needed. Latent ties were instrumental in this regard, leading to 
Anonymous retaliating and flexing its counter-power. However, it has to be 
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kept in mind though that despite the highly spectacular and symbolic nature 
of these attacks, the actual damage and disruption they caused was minimal.  
 
Furthermore, for the time being at least, it seems that the forces out to 
damage and silence WikiLeaks/Assange are prevailing and the culture of 
secrecy and information control restored. However, this is precisely the nature 
of the mediation opportunity structure for information and communication 
resistance; opportunities open up or are created, which are subsequently 
closed down after which new ones emerge.  
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2 quote from a public talk at Frontline Club, London, 26th July 2010 
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4 See: http://www.larrysanger.org/wikileaks.html [Last Consulted on 28 May 2013] 
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8 See: https://www.torproject.org/ [Last Consulted on 28 May 2013] 
9 US Patent No. 6266704 - Onion routing network for securely moving data through 
communication networks. 
10 See: https://www.thepaypalblog.com/2010/12/paypal-statement-regarding-wikileaks/ 
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11 See: 
http://thepiratebay.org/torrent/5741985/INSURANCE.AES256_WIKILEAKS.SECRET.DOC
UMENT.2010.08.06 [Last Consulted on 28 May 2013] 
12 See: http://twitter.com/#!/wikileaks/status/10058229002272768 [Last Consulted on 28 
May 2013] 
13 for an overview of official mirror-sites see: http://wikileaks.info/ [Last Consulted on 28 
May 2013] 
14 It has to be noted that most of these DDoS attacks resulted in rather limited downtime for 
most of the sites that were targeted. For example, Lieberman’s senate site was down for a total 
of 12 minutes, Sarah Palin PAC-site for 25 minutes, Paypal for 33 minutes, Mastercard for 1 
hour 17 minutes. The attack on the Swiss bank Postbank was more successful as their e-
banking services were down for a total of 33 hours. (Source: 
http://pandalabs.pandasecurity.com/tis-the-season-of-ddos-wikileaks-editio/ - Last 
Consulted on 28 May 2013) 
